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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The time to reform Minnesota’s criminal sexual conduct (“CSC”) 
laws is now.1 Conceptions of sex, rape, and consent have evolved from 
paternalistic ideals and given way to modern reforms and an ever-expanding 
understanding of sexual relationships. One need only watch cringeworthy 
interactions of sex symbols of earlier decades to understand how drastic this 
shift has been. For example, take what was an entirely acceptable scene in 
the PG-rated, 1964 film Goldfinger.2 James Bond corners his female co-
                                                           
ǂ Nate Summers is a recent graduate of the University of St. Thomas School of Law and 
current law clerk for the Honorable Judge Diane Bratvold. The opinions expressed here are 
his own, with considerable thanks to Professor Mark Osler of St. Thomas and Christina 
Warren and James Hanneman of the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, for their 
thoughtful guidance in composing this article and ceaseless service to the community. 
1 See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.341–.3451 (2019).  
2 GOLDFINGER (EON Productions 1964).  
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star, Pussy Galore, in a stable and makes several sexual advances, which 
Galore rejects.3 He then attacks Galore, who pushes him away.4 Finally, 
Bond pins Galore to the ground and kisses her.5 Galore continues to resist 
Bond, but eventually, Galore gives in, and the scene cuts away.6 Galore later 
changes allegiances and helps Bond defeat his nemesis, Auric Goldfinger.7 
The essential takeaway from this scene and the movie overall is clear: if not 
for Bond’s ability to overpower Galore’s initial lack of consent, Goldfinger 
would have been successful in his plan to destroy Fort Knox.8 
Recently, investigative journalists have exposed gaping holes in how 
Minnesota’s law enforcement agencies handle sexual assaults.9 These 
realizations prompted many reforms, including the use of trauma-informed 
interviewing techniques by investigators in cases of sexual assaults,10 and led 
to the repeal of some distasteful and outdated laws.11 However, the 
Minnesota Legislature’s work is not done.  
While Minnesota defines consent in modern terms,12 the 
definition’s interplay with the CSC statutes entirely misses the mark when it 
comes to the criminality of nonconsensual sexual conduct. Remnants of 
outdated rape statutes remain in the current CSC statutory framework, 
which requires either force or injury to elevate an offense to a felony.13 
Today in Minnesota, the law makes no distinction between nonconsensual 
                                                           





8 Id.  
9 See Brandon Stahl, Jennifer Bjorhus & MaryJo Webster, When Rape Is Reported and 




10 See Abby Honold Act, S. 171, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Dana Ferguson, Minnesota 
peace officers to adopt ‘victim-centered’ approach to sexual assault investigation, BRAINERD 
DISPATCH (July 25, 2019), https://www.brainerddispatch.com/news/government-and-
politics/4038212-Minnesota-peace-officers-to-adopt-victim-centered-approach-to-sexual-
assault-investigation [https://perma.cc/3G83-CHXQ] (detailing newly-adopted training 
requirements for police officers to support trauma-informed and victim-centered approaches 
to sexual assault investigations). 
11 See, e.g., Act of May 30, 2019, ch. 5, art. 4, § 9, 2019 Minn. Laws 43 (removing the 
“buttocks exception” to Fifth Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct, which originally excluded 
the “intentional touching of the clothing covering” the area of the buttocks from prosecution); 
MINN. STAT. § 609.349 (2018) (repealed 2019) (providing a voluntary relationship defense 
for criminal sexual conduct crimes). 
12 See MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 4 (2019).  
13 See id. § 609.3451 (indicating nonconsensual sexual contact is generally a gross 
misdemeanor). 
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sexual intercourse without force or injury and intentional, nonconsensual 
touching of a victim’s inner thigh.14  
The Legislature would be wise to adopt an affirmative consent 
standard into its CSC statutes, as it would accurately reflect the criminality 
of nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse. The Legislature need not 
look far for a working model of affirmative consent: Wisconsin has a 
relatively long history of using the affirmative consent standard to 
criminalize nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse, even without 
force or injury.15 Given recent controversy regarding Minnesota’s CSC 
statutes,16 the Legislature should adopt a version of Wisconsin’s sexual 
assault statutes to bring Minnesota’s statutes in line with modern 
conceptions of sex, rape, and consent.   
A.  The Problem 
Joanna Howe’s Lyft driver sexually assaulted her after he walked 
her to her apartment.17 Howe had been drinking earlier that night—her last 
memory was of a man standing over her as she lay naked on her bed.18 Police 
collected bedding and clothing from her room, and Howe underwent a 
sexual assault exam, but the results were inconclusive.19 Eventually, police 
were able to make contact with the suspect, and he admitted that Howe 
“seemed drunk, but . . . coherent.”20 He also admitted to staying at Howe’s 
apartment “for an ‘hour or so. We cuddled, and we had . . . both ways.’”21  
The case was referred to the Ramsey County Attorney’s Office in 
August 2017, but the office declined charges.22 The prosecutor told Howe 
that “because [the suspect] texted that she was coherent and that she walked 
up to the apartment with him, it would be reasonable for a jury to believe 
that she was not physically helpless,” as defined under Minnesota law.23 The 
suspect’s behavior was “absolutely outrageous,” Ramsey County Attorney 
John Choi said in an interview, “but from a prosecutor’s standpoint, there’s 
a question as to whether it violates the law.”24 From Howe’s standpoint, 
                                                           
14 See id. (defining fifth degree criminal sexual conduct). 
15 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 2020).  
16 Stahl et al., When Rape Is Reported, supra note 9; Ferguson, supra note 10. 
17 Brandon Stahl, Jennifer Bjorhus & MaryJo Webster, How Alcohol Foils Rape 
Investigations, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Stahl et al., How Alcohol Foils Rape 
Investigations], https://www.startribune.com/how-alcohol-foils-rape-investigations-in-
minnesota-denied-justice-part-three/488413421/ [https://perma.cc/RV49-774G]. 
18 See id. (containing Joanna Howe’s description of her sexual assault). 
19 Id.  
20 Id.  
21 Id. (ellipsis in original). 
22 Id.   
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
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however, “[t]here’s no way I could consent . . . . But because of the narrow 
way that laws have been interpreted in Minnesota in cases like mine, I won’t 
see any justice.”25 
On June 15, 2019, the St. Paul Police Department received a report 
of a sexual assault from a 911 caller.26 The caller stated that his friend “seems 
to be sexually assaulted and is not okay[.]”27 The caller continued, “[s]he left 
with a couple of guys and she is absolutely bawling her eyes out and doesn’t 
know what happened.”28 The victim went to a hospital, obtained treatment, 
and forensic evidence, including DNA, was collected.29 Two suspects were 
arrested and held, but charges were not filed, pending further investigation.30 
In a December 20, 2019 press conference, Hennepin County 
Attorney Mike Freeman announced that charges would not be filed in the 
case.31 This decision was made despite the appropriate interviewing 
techniques and prompt investigation Minnesota’s more recent reforms 
require.32 Freeman noted with frustration that “given Minnesota’s current 
laws regarding intoxication and a victim’s ability to give consent, we were 
working under some significant constraints.”33 While he would not say 
whether charges would have been filed had Minnesota’s laws reflected those 
in Wisconsin, he did ask the Minnesota Legislature to “seriously consider 
making changes to the criminal sexual conduct statute” during the 2020 
session.34  
B.  Outline 
This article seeks to provide context and analysis to the debate over 
affirmative consent and proposes the Minnesota Legislature adopt language 
that would absorb the affirmative consent standard into Minnesota’s CSC 
statutes. To this end, Part II discusses the origin of Minnesota’s current 
statutory scheme and describes the evolution of common law and 
Minnesota’s rape statutes from a patriarchic property-type crime to the 
                                                           
25 Id.  
26 No charges in University of Minnesota wrestling sexual assault investigation, FOX 9 (Dec. 
20, 2019), https://www.fox9.com/news/no-charges-in-university-of-minnesota-wrestling-
sexual-assault-investigation [https://perma.cc/RD4T-6RFQ] (detailing the investigation and 
decision not to pursue charges in a student-involved sexual assault case). 
27  Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Hennepin Attorney, No Charges Filed Against University of Minnesota Wrestlers, 
YOUTUBE (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sor6uVMHt4o, 
[https://perma.cc/C77N-PVYR]; see also No charges in University of Minnesota wrestling 
sexual assault investigation, supra note 26. 
31 Hennepin Attorney, supra note 30. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. 
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complicated statutory scheme we have today. In Part III, this article will 
discuss affirmative consent and show how, at least by its statutory definition, 
Minnesota has already adopted a form of affirmative consent, though 
affirmative consent is not represented in the broader CSC statutory 
structure. Part IV discusses arguments against affirmative consent and their 
counterarguments. Finally, in Parts V and VI, this article argues for a 
complete rehaul of Minnesota’s CSC statutes, with a focus on reforming 
what is currently defined in third-degree and fourth-degree CSC to cover 
sexual intercourse and contact without affirmative consent, and to generally 
simplify the CSC statutes. Proposed model language for the amended laws 
is provided as a guide for the Minnesota Legislature in Part VI. 
II.  A HISTORY OF PAST REFORMS OF MINNESOTA CRIMINAL SEXUAL 
CONDUCT LAWS 
Minnesota’s CSC statutes represent a complicated amalgamation of 
prohibited conduct. What began as a property offense against a victim’s 
husband or father has evolved steadily through the years to cover some 
forms of nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse.35 The laws have 
grown overly complicated as more and varied conduct has been proscribed, 
though even these reforms miss the crux of what constitutes rape in modern 
society: sexual conduct without consent. To better understand the 
Minnesota CSC statutes today, one must first understand the history behind 
the state’s current statutes.  
A.  First Rape Statutes and Early Reforms  
In the early years of statehood, Minnesota statutes did not 
specifically define rape; however, statutes did allow for punishment of rape 
based on its common law definition.36 However, this common law definition 
was highly prejudicial to victims and considered rape to be a property 
crime.37 The crime was based more on the supposed economic harm to a 
victim’s father or husband than the harm to the rape victim, and the 
punishment for rape had more to do with repaying the father or husband 
                                                           
35 Compare MINN. STAT., ch. 89, § 38 (1858) (repealed 1891) (“If any person shall ravish, 
and carnally know any female of the age of ten years or more, by force and against her will, 
he shall be punished by imprisonment in the territorial prison, not more than thirty years, 
nor less than ten years; but if the female on trial shall be proven to have been at the time of 
the offense, a common prostitute, he may be imprisoned not more than one year.”), with 
MINN. STAT. § 609.342 (2019). 
36 See State v. Pulle, 12 Minn. 164, 170 (1866) (“Our statutes do not create or define rape . . 
. . Yet such crimes are recognized and punished by statute . . . .”); see also MINN. STAT., ch. 
89, § 38 (1858) (repealed 1891). 
37 See State in Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1273 (1992) (“[R]ape had its legal origins 
in laws designed to protect the property rights of men to their wives and daughters.”). 
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for his supposed loss than censuring the offender or obtaining justice for the 
victim.38  
Early common law generally defined rape as “the carnal knowledge 
of a woman forcibly and against her will.”39 The common law definition was 
essentially codified in Minnesota’s first Territorial Statute of 1851.40 This 
definition, however, was highly problematic.  
First, the use of gendered terms meant the outright denial that a 
male could be a rape victim—a flawed norm that persisted well into the late 
20th century.41 In the rare case that sexual assault against a male was 
investigated and prosecuted, it was not recognized as a sexual assault but 
instead fell under the general assault statute.42 Thus, if successfully 
prosecuted, the assailant would receive a considerably lesser penalty than if 
he or she had been convicted of rape.43  
 Second, the force requirement meant a victim had to issue “the 
utmost” resistance for the force element to be met.44 Courts held that “[n]ot 
only must there be entire absence of mental consent or assent, but there 
must be the most vehement exercise of every physical means or faculty 
within the woman's power to resist the penetration of her person, and this 
must be shown to persist until the offense is consummated.”45 Thus, the 
                                                           
38 See, e.g., Deuteronomy 22: 28–29 (New Int’l Version) (“If a man happens to meet a virgin 
who is not pledged to be married and rapes her and they are discovered, he shall pay her 
father fifty shekels of silver. He must marry the young woman, for he has violated her. He 
can never divorce her as long as he lives.”). 
39 Rape, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
40 Compare MINN. STAT., ch. 92a., § 6523 (1894) (repealed 1967) (“Rape is an act of sexual 
intercourse with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, committed against her will or 
without her consent.”), with Askew v. State, 118 So. 2d 219, 221 (Fla. 1960) (“The common 
law crime of rape is composed of three essential elements: carnal knowledge, force, and the 
commission of the act without the consent or against the will of the female victim.”). 
41 See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 609.291–.292 (repealed 1975); see State v. Witt, 310 Minn. 
211, 217, 245 N.W.2d 612, 616–17 (1976) (noting that the gendered language of now-
repealed Minnesota Statute section 609.291–.292 showed the Minnesota Legislature made 
a “factual determination that the rape of women by men is a significant social problem, 
involving unique and potentially severe physiological, psychological, and social injuries and 
traumas, and that other forms of sexual penetration, including a woman forcing sexual 
intercourse upon a man, are much less serious social problems because they occur extremely 
infrequently or because the harms they inflict are less grave, or because of both of these 
factors.”) (internal citation omitted).  
42 See generally Charlie Savage, U.S. to Expand Its Definition of Rape in Statistics, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/us/politics/federal-crime-
statistics-to-expand-rape-definition.html [https://perma.cc/65GT-U2H7] (detailing the 
history of terminology in criminal sexual conduct cases that excluded types of assault that 
victimized men).   
43 See MINN. STAT., ch. 100, § 45 (1851) (repealed 1858) (setting a maximum of 3 years and 
a minimum 6 months in prison for assault with intent).  
44 Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 541 (Wis. 1906). 
45 Id. at 538.  
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victim’s actions were put on trial. Victims could not simply state that they 
resisted their assaulters, they had to “relate the very acts done [to resist], in 
order that the jury and the court may judge whether any were omitted.”46 
Victims were expected to “interpose most effective obstacles by means of 
hands and limbs and pelvic muscles,”47 without which even guilty verdicts 
would be overturned.  
Because of the force and resistance requirements, common law 
shifted the focus of rape trials away from the defendant and onto the victim 
in ways otherwise unheard of in criminal law.48 Judges and juries questioned 
whether a rape victim resisted their assailant and whether that resistance was 
enough to constitute a rape.49 According to early courts, “[m]ere verbal 
unwillingness does not amount to want of consent, and may amount to 
invitation.”50 Thus, in order for the force element to be met, courts looked 
at “the circumstances of each case, such as the time, place, and character of 
the assault, and the age, intelligence, courage, and temperament of the 
female.”51 Clearly, the latter elements of the victim’s intelligence, courage, 
and temperament subjected victims to substantial personal examination. 
After that examination, “whatever the circumstances may be, there must be 
the greatest effort of which she is capable therein to foil the pursuer and 
preserve the sanctity of her person” for a rape conviction to stand.52 This 
element, flawed as it is, remains present in most of Minnesota’s current CSC 
statutes.53  
Finally, the common law definition completely excluded the 
possibility of marital rape—a standard which continued in Minnesota until 
2019.54 This definition reflected the patriarchal nature of marital and sexual 
relationships. When a woman married her husband, she gave up the ability 
to withdraw consent to sexual intercourse—all the law required in terms of 
                                                           
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 See Daphne Edwards, Acquaintance Rape & the “Force” Element: When “No” Is Not 
Enough, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 241, 251 (1996) (“The element of lack of consent 
and resistance had enabled courts to focus attention solely on the propriety of the victim's 
behavior.”). 
49 Id. 
50 State v. Cowing, 99 Minn. 123, 126, 108 N.W. 851, 852 (1906). 
51 State v. Ingraham, 118 Minn. 13, 14, 136 N.W. 258, 259 (1912).  
52 Cowing, 99 Minn. at 129, 108 N.W. at 853 (quoting People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374, 383 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1874)). 
53 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.345, subdiv. 1(c) (2019). The force and coercion 
requirements harken back to the days where a showing of resistance was necessary, requiring 
the perpetrator to exhibit characteristics necessary to overcome resistance. Id.  
54 Id. § 609.349 (2018), repealed by Act of May 2, 2019, ch. 16, § 1, 2019 Minn. Laws 1 
(removing the voluntary relationship defense in criminal sexual conduct cases.). 
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her consent was “I do” at the marriage ceremony.55 From that point onward, 
consent was assumed in terms of marital sexual intercourse, even if force or 
injury were involved.56   
In the late nineteenth century, the Minnesota Legislature defined 
the crime of rape and established several principles that would survive until 
today, including the first use of consent in the statutes.57 The Legislature 
defined rape as sexual intercourse with a female who is not the wife of the 
perpetrator against her will or without her consent. 58 The definition made 
sexual intercourse with a female under the age of ten illegal, so long as the 
female was not the perpetrator’s wife, and outlined five circumstances under 
which a female victim could be raped.59  
First, a victim could be incapable of consent if she had what was 
called an “idiocy, imbecility, or any unsoundness of mind.”60 This definition 
allowed the protection of the mentally ill and covered both temporary and 
permanent mental illnesses.61 Next, the statute codified the resistance 
requirement, requiring that a victim either have “her resistance forcibly 
overcome”62 or show that “her resistance is prevented by fear of immediate 
and great bodily harm which she has reasonable cause to believe will be 
inflicted upon her.”63 The statute also allowed the resistance requirement to 
be met when a victim’s “resistance is prevented by stupor or by weakness of 
mind, produced by an intoxicating narcotic or anesthetic agent,” though the 
intoxicant had to be administered by the defendant or with his knowledge.64 
Finally, the statute prohibited sexual intercourse with an unconscious victim, 
so long as the defendant knew the victim was unconscious.65  
This definition statutorily enshrined many of the common law 
problems discussed above and simultaneously laid the groundwork for a 
modern CSC statutory framework. First, the statute codified the common 
                                                           
55 See id. (“A person does not commit criminal sexual conduct . . . if the actor and 
complainant were adults cohabiting in an ongoing voluntary sexual relationship at the time 
of the alleged offense, or if the complainant is the actor’s legal spouse . . . .”); see also Jill 
Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
1373, 1396–98 (2000). 
56 See MINN. STAT. § 609.349 (2018) (repealed 2019). Presumably, a forward-thinking 
prosecutor could charge the husband with assault in the same way she could charge the 
assailant of a male victim, though the likelihood of a jury returning a guilty verdict would be 
slim.  
57 See id. § 6191 (1891) (amended 1967). 
58 Id. 
59 See id.; see also id. § 6192.  
60 Id. § 6191, subdiv. 1.  
61 Id. § 6191, subdiv. 4. 
62 Id. § 6191, subdiv. 2. 
63 Id. § 6191, subdiv. 3. 
64 Id. § 6191, subdiv. 4. 
65 Id. § 6191, subdiv. 5. 
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law doctrine that a married woman cannot be raped by her husband.66 It 
also cemented the gendered terms, which ignored the possibility of rape 
perpetrated against a non-female.67 The statute also failed to criminalize 
sexual conduct not amounting to intercourse, thus without “any sexual 
penetration, however slight,” the crime could not occur.68 Most importantly, 
the statute codified the above-mentioned force requirement.69 If a victim was 
not mentally impaired, intoxicated, or unconscious, she was required to 
resist “to the utmost” in order to meet the force element.70  
However, the statute did take several positive steps toward 
recognizing the importance of consent and the criminality of a lack of 
consent. Subdivisions 1, 4, and 5 of the statute prohibited sexual intercourse 
with a person who is incapable of giving consent, whether due to mental 
condition, intoxicant, or unconsciousness.71 These subdivisions recognized 
that, in some situations, consent and resistance are not possible and created 
a method of prosecuting rape without inquiry into the victim’s resistance.72 
Additionally, in subdivision 3, the statute recognized that fear of bodily harm 
could cause a victim to be unable to resist.73 While the statute required the 
fear to be of immediate and great bodily harm, it did provide another 
avenue for prosecution.74 However, the victim would still be subjected to 
scrutiny by the judge or jury, as fear was required to be “reasonable” in their 
eyes.75  
 These statutes were re-codified as sections 617.01 and 617.02 of 
the Minnesota Statutes in 1941 and remained unchanged for decades.76 
Then, in 1967, the Minnesota Legislature divided rape into two 
classifications: rape and aggravated rape.77 Aggravated rape absorbed much 
of 1891’s earlier definition.78 Aggravated rape was defined as sexual 
intercourse with a female who is not the perpetrator’s wife, without consent, 
                                                           
66 Id. § 6191 (defining rape as “an act of sexual intercourse with a female not the wife of the 
perpetrator.”). 
67 Id.  
68 Id. § 6194. 
69 Id. § 6191, subdiv. 2. 
70 State v. Ingraham, 118 Minn. 13, 17, 136 N.W. 258, 260 (1912) (“To constitute the crime 
of rape, the will of the female must have been outraged, and her will must have been forcibly 
overcome, and, as I have stated, she must resist to the utmost of her ability, to the utmost 
extent of her ability.”). 
71 MINN. STAT. § 6191, subdivs. 1, 4, and 5 (1891) (amended 1967). 
72 See id. 
73 Id. § 6191, subdiv. 3.  
74 Id. 
75 See id. 
76 Id. §§ 617.01–.02 (repealed 1967). 
77 Id. §§ 609.291–.292 (1967) (repealed 1975). 
78 Compare id. § 609.291 (1967) (repealed 1975), with id. § 6194 (1891) (amended 1967). 
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under one of three circumstances.79 These required circumstances are that: 
(1) the victim’s resistance must have been overcome by force, (2) the victim’s 
resistance was prevented by a reasonable fear of imminent and great bodily 
harm to herself or another, or (3) the victim was physically unconscious, 
physically powerless to resist, or incapable of consent because of a mental 
illness and that condition was known to the defendant.80 A conviction for 
aggravated rape carried a maximum sentence of thirty years in prison.81 
Where an intoxicant stopped a victim’s resistance to rape, the charge was 
relegated to non-aggravated rape.82 The statute was also expanded to include 
situations where the victim was induced to believe the perpetrator was their 
husband and where the victim was misled regarding the nature of the acts 
committed.83 Non-aggravated rape was punishable by no more than ten 
years in prison.84  
 These amendments represented the first instance of gradation of 
different degrees of rape. They also represent the first example of the 
Legislature determining that one type of rape should be punished more 
severely—indeed up to three times more severely—depending on the 
circumstances of the assault.85 Interestingly, in making that distinction, the 
Legislature signaled that an assailant who used an intoxicant to “destroy the 
victim’s resistance” was somehow less culpable than an assailant who 
sexually assaulted a victim while she was unconscious.86 This early 
distinction likely reflected a still-emerging conception of a type of rape that 
could occur without consent and without force or coercion.87  
B.  Modern CSC Statutory Scheme  
In 1975, the aforementioned rape statutes were repealed entirely 
and replaced with the first version of Minnesota’s CSC statutes.88 Today, 
these statutes begin with a definitions section and then proceed to describe 
                                                           
79 Id. § 609.291 (1967) (repealed 1975). 
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. § 609.292. 
83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 See id. §§ 609.291–.292. 
86 Compare id. § 609.291, with id. § 609.292.  
87 Kyla Bishop, A Reflection on the History of Sexual Assault Laws in the United States, ARK. 
J. OF SOC. CHANGE AND PUB. SERV. (Apr. 15, 2018), 
https://ualr.edu/socialchange/2018/04/15/reflection-history-sexual-assault-laws-united-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/EKJ7-W6GC]. The 1960s onward ushered in significant progress in 
American rape law as the anti-rape movement emerged as violence against women became 
a central point in the second-wave feminist movement. Id.  
88 MINN. STAT. §§ 609.341–.345 (1975). 
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five varying degrees of CSC.89 These varying degrees of CSC have been 
expanded upon substantially through the years90 but have, to date, missed 
the mark as to the criminality of sexual intercourse without consent.  
1. Consent Definition  
Minnesota has a strong, accurate, and well-worded definition of 
consent. The Legislature has defined consent as “words or overt actions by 
a person indicating a freely given present agreement to perform a particular 
sexual act with the actor.”91 Using language strikingly similar to the 
Wisconsin definition,92 Minnesota’s definition allows for the indication of 
consent through both words and actions, requires consent be freely given, 
and applies only to the current agreement to perform the particular act in 
question.93  
This definition fits nicely into the affirmative consent model and 
does not require amendment.94 Indeed, the definitional statute takes further 
steps to ensure corroboration of victim testimony is not required to prove 
lack of consent, and to define what does not constitute consent: “[c]onsent 
does not mean the existence of a prior or current social relationship between 
the actor and the complainant or that the complainant failed to resist a 
particular sexual act.”95 The consent definition also notes that a person who 
is mentally incapacitated or physically helpless cannot provide consent.96 
Therefore, Minnesota’s consent definition accurately reflects the affirmative 
                                                           
89 See id. §§ 609.341–.345 (2019). 
90 The amendments following 1975 focus almost entirely on broadening or narrowing specific 
definitions. This is particularly true of the definition of “position of authority,” which will not 
be discussed in this paper as consent is not relevant if the defendant was in a position of 
authority at the time of the assault.  
91 MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 4(a) (2019).  
92 In pertinent part, “‘[c]onsent’, as used in this section, means words or overt actions by a 
person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to 
have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2020).  
93 MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 4 (2019). 
94 Though specifically adding the word “informed” before “consent” as in the Wisconsin 
statute would more clearly articulate that Minnesota has intentionally adopted the informed 
consent standard, the definition as it stands would suffice if the rest of the CSC framework 
were amended.  
95 MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 4(a) (2019). 
96 Id. § 609.341, subdiv. 7 (“[A] person [who], as a result of inadequately developed or 
impaired intelligence or a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought or mood, lacks the 
judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or to sexual penetration.”); id. § 
609.341, subdiv. 9 (“[A] person [who] is (a) asleep or not conscious, (b) unable to withhold 
consent or to withdraw consent because of a physical condition, or (c) unable to 
communicate nonconsent and the condition is known or reasonably should have been 
known to the actor.”). 
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consent model, but issues arise from its interplay with the five degrees of 
Minnesota’s CSC statutes.  
2. CSC Framework  
Minnesota breaks the CSC crimes into five degrees based on the 
degree of force or injury a victim sustains and the distinction between sexual 
penetration and sexual contact.97 Interestingly, with the 1975 retooling of 
rape law in Minnesota, the Legislature proposed to do away entirely with 
the resistance requirement, stating specifically that in prosecution under the 
new CSC statutes, “there is no need to show that the victim resisted the 
accused.”98 The change was laudable as an attempt to shift the focus of rape 
prosecutions away from the victim’s actions and onto the defendant. 
However, in using force, injury, or contact, combined with penetration to 
rank offenses, the current Legislature has failed to recognize the specific 
criminality of nonconsensual sexual penetration without force, injury or 
contact.99  
Fifth-degree CSC represents the base CSC offense and prohibits 
nonconsensual sexual contact.100 Fifth-degree CSC was added to the CSC 
statutes in 1988 and represents the only CSC level that does not require 
additional elements aside from nonconsensual sexual contact.101 Fourth-
degree CSC adds to nonconsensual contact, the additional element of force 
or coercion.102 Third-degree CSC prohibits sexual penetration by force or 
coercion.103 Second- and first-degree CSC prohibit sexual contact or 
penetration, respectively, by force or coercion, resulting in personal injury.104  
As it stands, Minnesota law fails to distinguish nonconsensual 
sexual intercourse from nonconsensual sexual contact without force or an 
injury.105 Without some additional element, nonconsensual sexual 
intercourse would have to be punished under the same statute as 
nonconsensual sexual contact, fifth-degree CSC, which prohibits, among 
                                                           
97 The distinction between sexual contact and sexual penetration is particularly relevant here. 
Sexual contact is defined as intentional touching of a victim’s intimate parts. Id. § 609.341, 
subdiv. 11. While sexual penetration includes sexual intercourse or other acts where the 
intrusion, however slight, of a body part or object into the genital or anal openings. Id. § 
609.341, subdiv. 12. Sexual contact and sexual penetration are both considered sexual 
conduct under Minnesota law.    
98 Id. § 609.347, subdiv. 2 (1975).  
99 See id. §§ 609.342–.3451 (2019) (equating unconsented touching with penetration under 
Minnesota’s statutory scheme).  
100 Id. § 609.3451, subdiv. 1(1).  
101 Id. § 609.3451. 
102 Id. § 609.345, subdiv. 1(c) (2019).  
103 Id. § 609.344, subdiv. 1(c). 
104 Id. § 609.343, subdiv. 1(e)(i); Id. § 609.342, subdiv. 1(e)(i). 
105 See id. § 609.3451, subdiv. 1. 
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other things, nonconsensual touching of a victim’s inner thigh over 
clothing.106 Perhaps because of the lack of a specific statute criminalizing 
nonconsensual sexual intercourse, Minnesota case law has so broadly 
defined force and injury that the terms almost lack real meaning.107  
Both sexual contact and intercourse, like any crime committed by 
one person against another, undoubtedly require some amount of force to 
execute. The force required to complete sexual intercourse is defined as 
intrinsic force; thus, any force “above and beyond” that required to 
complete sexual intercourse is defined as extrinsic force.108 Since force in 
this context is used as an enhancement, one might assume extrinsic force, 
which is necessary to complete the act, would be required. However, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has essentially adopted an intrinsic force 
standard for the element of force in the CSC statutes. In Matter of Welfare 
of D.L.K., a fourteen-year-old came up behind a classmate, tapped her on 
the shoulder and grabbed and pinched her breast.109 The only force used in 
the assault was the pinching itself.110 However, the Court held that the 
defendant’s “sudden and painful grabbing and pinching of the victim's breast 
[was] sufficient use of force” to sustain a fourth-degree CSC conviction.111 
Therefore, even the intrinsic force required to complete a sexual act may 
be considered enough to meet the required force element in Minnesota’s 
CSC statutes.  
Similarly, the level of injury required to meet the injury 
enhancement is quite low. The statute defines personal injury as “bodily 
harm [including physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition], or severe mental anguish or pregnancy.”112 Thus if a 
victim testifies they felt even a “minimal amount of physical pain or injury,” 
the element is satisfied.113 Moreover, the injury “need not necessarily be 
coincidental with actual sexual penetration, they need only be sufficiently 
related to the act to constitute ‘personal injury’” as defined in section 
609.314 of the Minnesota Statutes.114 Consequently, evidence that a victim 
                                                           
106 Compare id., with id. § 609.344 (illustrating that sexual penetration is only punished more 
severely when accompanied by force, coercion or perpetrated against a minor, an impaired 
individual, or where specific trustee relationships exist). 
107 In practice, bodily harm in the form of vaginal redness and soreness from the surprise 
sexual contact suffices to show force. State v. Stufflebean, 329 N.W.2d 314, 316 (Minn. 
1983). Coercion exists where a defendant creates subjective fear by telling a victim to “shut 
up” while holding the victim down and pushing the victim’s dress up. State v. Meech, 400 
N.W.2d 166, 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
108 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 17.3(a) (3d ed. 2017).  
109 In re Welfare of D.L.K., 381 N.W.2d 435, 436 (Minn. 1986).   
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 438.   
112 MINN. STAT. § 609.431, subdiv. 8 (2019) (referencing id. § 609.02, subdiv. 7 (2019)). 
113 State v. Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2003). 
114 State v. Sollman, 402 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
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felt even a minimum amount of pain or sustained injuries only minimally 
related to the assault is sufficient for the injury enhancement.  
These relatively low standards for force and injury are likely a 
response to the fact that Minnesota law requires additional elements to 
properly distinguish nonconsensual intercourse from nonconsensual 
contact.115 The lack of a clear statute likely led the courts to these low 
standards; however, these decisions have left us with a strange situation 
where almost all CSC statutes overlap significantly.116 As one commentator 
noted, because of these low thresholds:  
[t]he personal injury element will be satisfied in every case 
involving a nonconsensual sexual act. Nonconsensual 
sexual acts necessarily involve pain or mental anguish, 
either of which can constitute bodily harm. The only 
difference between third- and first-degree CSC is the 
addition of the aggravating element of personal injury. The 
same is true of fourth- and second-degree CSC. Because 
the injury element will be satisfied in every case, by proving 
third-degree CSC, the state can necessarily prove first-
degree CSC and likewise, by proving fourth-degree CSC, 
the state can necessarily prove second-degree CSC.117 
While the low thresholds have certainly made the CSC statutes workable 
for the last few decades, it is time to reform the statutes to make a clear, 
workable statutory scheme that does not require loose definitions and 
overlapping factors to function.  
3.  Physically Helpless  
Another workaround to Minnesota’s lack of a strong, 
nonconsensual sexual intercourse statute has been the use of third-degree 
CSC, where a defendant knows the victim is physically helpless.118 This 
provision has been used when a victim is voluntarily extremely intoxicated 
and cannot consent to sexual conduct.119 An earlier version of the definition 
of physically helpless defined the term as, among other things, when a victim 
was “unable to withhold consent or to withdraw because of a physical 
                                                           
115 See MINN. STAT. § 609.3451. 
116 Compare id. § 609.342, subdiv. 1(e)(i), with id. § 609.344, subdiv. 1(c) (illustrating the de 
minimus nature of an injury necessary to show first-degree sexual assault, rendering third-
degree assault practically redundant).  
117 Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Minnesota’s Criminal Sexual Conduct Statutes: A Call for Change, 
39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1623, 1632 (2013).  
118 MINN. STAT. § 609.344, subdiv. 1(d).  
119 See e.g., State v. Berrios, 788 N.W.2d 135, 142 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Owen, 
No. A18-0318, 2018 WL 6273120, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2018); State v. Wille, No. 
A16-1710, 2017 WL 3585108, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2017). 
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condition.”120 Thus, if a victim was so intoxicated they could not withdraw 
from the situation, a jury could find the defendant guilty of felony third-
degree CSC.121 This was until 1994 when the Minnesota Legislature inserted 
a single word into the definition: “consent.”122  
In State v. Blevins, the Minnesota Court of Appeals explained the 
result of the Legislature’s addition of the word “consent” into the physically 
helpless definition.123 In Blevins, the victim voluntarily consumed ten to 
twelve alcoholic beverages and became intoxicated.124 Blevins, the 
defendant, approached the victim and told her he would help her find her 
car.125 Instead, Blevins took the victim to the back porch of a house and 
downstairs to a crawl space under the porch.126 There, Blevins made sexual 
advances and eventually engaged in oral and vaginal intercourse with the 
victim.127 The victim testified “she felt stuck, uncomfortable, and afraid, she 
‘just let it happen’ and ‘waited for it to be over.’”128 Blevins was charged with 
and convicted of third-degree CSC, sexual penetration of a physically 
helpless victim, and challenged the sufficiency of evidence for his 
conviction.129  
In an earlier case, State v. Griffith,130 the same court was presented 
with very similar facts and sustained the conviction because the victim in 
Griffith “felt helpless to stop the attack,” and the complainant's 
“‘helplessness’ was due to her ‘physical condition,’” Griffith’s conviction was 
upheld.131 In Griffith, physically helpless was defined as “unable to withhold 
consent or to withdraw because of a physical condition,”132 and “withdraw” 
was interpreted as referring to the physical ability to withdraw from the 
attack.133 Because the victim’s extreme intoxication made her unable to 
physically withdraw from the assault, the court upheld the conviction.134  
                                                           
120 MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 9 (1982) (amended 1994). 
121 See State v. Griffith, 480 N.W.2d 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding defendant’s 
conviction where victim was too drunk to leave the situation), superseded by statute, MINN. 
STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 9(b) (1994), as recognized in State v. Cobb, No. A14-0422, 2015 
WL 853421, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2015).  
122 MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 9 (1994). 
123 State v. Blevins, 757 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).  





129 Id. at 700–01.  
130 480 N.W.2d 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).  
131 Id. at 350. 
132 Id. at 349. 
133 Id. at 351. 
134 Id. (upholding a conviction whereby the victim passed out and remained unconscious 
during most of the assault).  
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However, in Blevins, the court noted the Legislature amended the 
physically helpless statute, which now reads “unable to withhold consent or 
to withdraw consent because of a physical condition.”135 The State now had 
to prove the victim was unable to withhold or withdraw consent, rather than 
simply being unable to withdraw physically.136 Because the victim was able 
to verbalize her lack of consent, and indeed repeatedly verbalized her lack 
of consent before and during the assault, the court found she was not 
physically helpless as defined by the newly amended statute, and the 
defendant’s conviction was reversed.137 
Under this holding, the level of intoxication necessary for a victim 
to be physically helpless, and thus unable to consent to sexual conduct, is 
exorbitantly high.138 Indeed, the 1994 amendment had the effect of 
comingling two of the three-pronged definition of physically helpless.139 
Physically helpless is defined as “(a) asleep or not conscious, (b) unable to 
withhold consent or to withdraw consent because of a physical condition, or 
(c) unable to communicate nonconsent.”140 In the Blevins holding, what 
difference is there between a victim being (b) unable to withhold or withdraw 
consent because of a physical condition and (c) unable to communicate 
nonconsent?141 The Minnesota Legislature must act to set a reasonable 
standard for when a person is too intoxicated to consent to sexual conduct. 
It can do so by codifying a definition of affirmative consent.  
III. AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT 
While Minnesota’s statutory definition of consent largely comports 
with other definitions of affirmative consent, it is important to understand 
the standard and how it should be adopted into Minnesota’s broader CSC 
statutes. Affirmative consent standards have been adopted by the vast 
majority of higher education institutions and have worked well in Wisconsin 
for many years.142  
                                                           
135 State v. Blevins, 757 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added). 
136 Id. at 701.  
137 Id.  
138 See id. (inferring that the level of intoxication must be elevated to the point of preventing 
speech). 
139 MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 9 (1994). 
140 Id. § 609.341, subdiv. 9 (2019). 
141 See id.  
142 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 442 (2016) 
(“An estimated 1,400 institutions of higher education have adopted disciplinary standards 
that codify an affirmative definition of sexual consent.”); see also, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
940.225(4) (West 2020) (defining “consent” as meaning “words or overt actions by a person 
who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual 
intercourse or sexual contact”).  
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A. Defining Affirmative Consent 
Affirmative consent is generally defined as “a rebuttable 
presumption of nonconsent, which would be overcome by any affirmative 
expression of desire for sex.”143 A participant must be legally able to give 
consent, meaning they are of age and in an appropriate mental state.144 The 
consent must be freely given and not made based on a threat or perceived 
threat to the participant or another.145 Finally, the consent must be to the 
present sexual encounter—one cannot assume that consent was given based 
on a prior sexual relationship.146 While these elements may seem overly 
rigid, affirmative consent is a relatively flexible standard, which comports 
with modern concepts of consent and sexuality, and has worked as an 
effective standard in Wisconsin.  
1.   “Yes Means Yes” 
Affirmative consent may be best known by the “Yes Means Yes” 
catchphrase.147 However, the phrase itself is more of a response to the “No 
Means No” campaign, as proponents realized the ineffectiveness of that 
campaign.148 “No Means No” was originally designed to highlight that when 
a person says “no” to sexual conduct, they mean it.149 However, “No Means 
No” misses the important point that there are more ways to decline sexual 
conduct than by saying no, and that a person is responsible for interpreting 
nonverbal signals and cues as well as listening to verbal ones.150 More 
                                                           
143 David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 317, 400 (2000). 
  
144 See MINN. STAT. § 609.345, subdiv. 1(f) (defining Minnesota’s graduated age of consent, 
which adjusts with the age of the perpetrator).  
145 See id. § 609.345, subdiv. 1(c) (prohibiting the use of force or coercion in obtaining 
consent). 
146 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(3) (West 2020); see also State v. Anchico, No. 87-1414, 
1988 WL 112263, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1988) (holding that evidence of a prior 
consensual sexual relationship was neither material nor relevant to consent as to the alleged 
nonconsensual encounter). 
147 See JACLYN FRIEDMAN & JESSICA VALENTI, YES MEANS YES!: VISIONS OF FEMALE SEXUAL 
POWER AND A WORLD WITHOUT RAPE (2008) (Friedman’s 2008 book popularized the 
phrase). 
148 Megan Garber, The Dangerous Insufficiency of ‘No Means No’, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/08/the-dangerous-
insufficiency-of-no-means-no/566465/ [https://perma.cc/C8ZQ-YZDL]. 
149 See Karen Lehrman, When ‘No’ Means ‘No’, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 1996), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/09/books/when-no-means-no.html, 
[https://perma.cc/3GPV-6MSV]. 
150 See Garber, supra note 148 (“[E]ven Harvey Weinstein . . . understood the basic sanctity 
of no means no. His method, it seems, was simply to try everything he could to greasily 
manipulate the no into a yes: ignoring the no, effectively, while . . . abiding by the wishes of 
the woman.”). 
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importantly, “Yes Means Yes” represents the idea that consent is an 
affirmative action and not the lack of declination to act.151 “Yes Means Yes” 
stands for the proposition that consent standards should look for an 
affirmative agreement to sexual conduct, rather than assuming that the lack 
of a “no” means the party consented.  
The “Yes Means Yes” standard has especially gained popularity on 
college campuses as schools define sexual assault and consent for Title IX 
purposes,152 though the precise language of the standard varies. More than 
800 colleges and universities have adopted the standard in one way or 
another.153 The University of St. Thomas, for example, expounds a “Yes 
Means Yes” standard; however, even the language of this policy indicates 
nonverbal conduct may also be construed as affirmative consent.154 Mitchell 
Hamline School of Law similarly defines consent,155 as does the University 
of Minnesota.156 Under these definitions, affirmative consent does not 
literally mean that “yes means yes.” Parties are not required under the 
affirmative consent doctrine to literally ask for verbal reassurance that their 
partner is affirmatively consenting to sexual relations. These policies 
illustrate that a clear indication of free agreement, through conduct or 
words, to engage in the sexual act is all that is required.  
These policy statements also include another important portion of 
the affirmative consent doctrine, that “[c]onsent to one form of sexual 
activity does not imply consent to other forms of sexual activity.”157 Thus, 
affirmative consent to one act is not affirmative consent to another. 
Affirmative consent must occur before any sexual activity escalates.  
While other definitions of affirmative consent exist in the Title IX 
realm, affirmative consent is simply the requirement that, just like in 
                                                           
151 See id. (noting affirmative consent represents “active affirmation, rather than passive 
acquiescence, that feminists have fought for.”). 
152 Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C § 1681 (addressing sex-based discrimination 
against students or employees at federally funded educational institutions).  
153 The NCHERM Group, LLC, The NCHERM Group Continues to Advocate for 
Affirmative Consent Policies in Colleges and Schools Across the Nation, CISION PR 
NEWSWIRE (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-ncherm-group-
continues-to-advocate-for-affirmative-consent-policies-in-colleges-and-schools-across-the-
nation-278778841.html [https://perma.cc/HQR4-FBC7].  
154 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS, Consent, in SEXUAL MISCONDUCT POLICY § IV(A)(2)(c), 7–8 
(Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.stthomas.edu/title-ix/sexualmisconduct/ 
[https://perma.cc/3S44-5KYZ].  
155 MITCHELL HAMLINE SCH. OF L., Consent, in SEXUAL MISCONDUCT POLICY FOR 
STUDENTS § III(V) (2020), https://mitchellhamline.edu/catalog/sexual-misconduct-policy-
for-students/ [https://perma.cc/VE59-7F4Y].  
156 UNIV. OF MINN., Definitions: Sexual Assault, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT, SEXUAL ASSAULT, 
STALKING AND RELATIONSHIP VIOLENCE POLICY STATEMENT 23 (Aug. 13, 2020), 
https://policy.umn.edu/operations/sexualassault [https://perma.cc/6R78-Z237].  
157 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS, supra note 154, at 8. 
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contracts, medical procedures, or any other potentially life-altering 
agreement, both parties knowingly agree to the action to be taken.158 As 
comedian John Oliver put it, “sex is like boxing, if one of the parties didn’t 
agree to participate, the other one is committing a crime.”159 The form the 
affirmative consent takes, whether verbal or nonverbal, does not matter so 
much as the fact that all parties' affirmatively consent. Whether the boxers 
sign a form saying they consent to the match, verbally agree just before 
bumping gloves, or exert overt and clear actions indicating their present 
willingness to spar, affirmative consent is the standard required.160  
B.  Affirmative Consent in Action  
Minnesota should strive to emulate Wisconsin’s affirmative consent 
sexual assault statutes. Adopting a statutory scheme similar to that of 
Wisconsin would give teeth to Minnesota’s consent definition and allow 
prosecution of rape regardless of how the victim reacted to it.161 Wisconsin 
divides sexual assaults into four levels, with additional factors aggravating 
nonconsensual contact up to a class B felony, punishable by a maximum of 
60 years in prison.162  
On the lowest end of the spectrum, Wisconsin defines fourth-
degree sexual assault simply as “sexual contact with a person without the 
consent of that person,”163 so long as that contact does not involve additional 
aggravating factors.164 This statute mirrors Minnesota’s fifth-degree CSC, as 
                                                           
158 See, e.g., Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 701 (Minn. 1977) (noting that doctors 
must disclose information that a reasonable patient would find material to treatment to 
illustrate consent); State v. Schweich, 414 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (citing 
U.S. v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301, 1304 (8th Cir. 1984)) (holding that under Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, “[m]isrepresentation used to obtain consent to a search will invalidate the 
consent”); Carpenter v. Vreeman, 409 N.W.2d 258, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (citing 
Restatement of Contracts (Second) § 164(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1981)) (“A contract is voidable 
if a party's assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the 
other party . . . .”).  
159 LastWeekTonight, Sex Education: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), 
YOUTUBE (Aug. 9, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L0jQz6jqQS0 
[https://perma.cc/5ZXX-CT3S]. 
160 State v. Peek, A04-1535, 2005 WL 2495773, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2005) (“[I]t 
does not follow that where consent is present, such as in the ‘mutual combat’ situation posited 
by Peek, that consent is a defense to assault.”).  
161 See Hennepin Attorney, supra note 30.  
162 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50(3)(b) (West 2020).  
163 Id. § 940.225(3m). 
164 Id. at (5)(b)(2) (intentional ejaculation or emission of urine or feces by defendant upon any 
part of complainant’s body, clothed or unclothed); Id. at (5)(b)(3) (“For the purpose of 
sexually degrading or humiliating the complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying the 
defendant, intentionally causing the complainant to ejaculate or emit urine or feces on any 
part of the defendant's body, whether clothed or unclothed.”).  
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it criminalizes nonconsensual sexual contact, though fifth-degree CSC is 
punishable by not more than one-year imprisonment,165 while Wisconsin’s 
fourth-degree sexual assault is punishable by no more than nine months 
imprisonment.166   
Importantly, the next step up in Wisconsin’s sexual assault statutory 
scheme proscribes “sexual intercourse with a person without the consent of 
that person.”167 In conjunction with Wisconsin’s consent definition, this 
statute is the key element missing from Minnesota’s CSC statutory scheme. 
It simply makes sexual intercourse without consent illegal—full stop.168 There 
is no force, injury, coercion, position of authority, or special victim 
requirement.169 Importantly, it also makes nonconsensual sexual intercourse 
a felony, punishable by imprisonment for up to ten years.170 The adoption 
of similar language and similar punishment will move Minnesota’s CSC 
statutory scheme out of the grasp of flawed common law doctrines and into 
an era where sexual intercourse requires affirmative consent. Anything less 
than full adoption of this standard will allow Minnesota’s CSC laws to 
continue to miss the criminality of nonconsensual sexual intercourse.  
Wisconsin has two degrees of aggravated sexual assault. Second-
degree sexual assault builds on the fourth- and third-degree statutes 
proscribing sexual contact or intercourse with another person without their 
consent and adds an additional element of a threat of force or violence or 
personal injury.171 First-degree sexual assault is reserved for when the assault 
results in great bodily harm or pregnancy, or when the defendant uses or 
threatens to use a dangerous weapon to complete the assault.172 Rather than 
requiring low threshold definitions of force or injury, Wisconsin simply 
ranks sexual assaults based on the use of threats, minor or major injury, or 
the use or threat of a dangerous weapon.173 Not only does this statutory 
scheme simplify sexual assaults compared to Minnesota’s CSC statutes, the 
straightforward definitions and use of affirmative consent accurately reflects 
the criminality of sexual contact or intercourse without consent.  
In addition, Wisconsin’s second-degree sexual assault statute 
includes intercourse with sexual contact or intercourse with “a person who 
is under the influence of an intoxicant to a degree which renders that person 
incapable of giving consent,” so long as the defendant has knowledge of the 
                                                           
165 MINN. STAT. § 609.3451, subdiv. 2 (2019). 
166 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.51(3)(a) (West 2020).  
167 Id. § 940.225(3)(a).  
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. § 939.50(3)(g).  
171 Id. § 940.225(2)(a)–(b).  
172 Id. § 940.225(1)(a)–(b).  
173 Id. § 940.225. 
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person’s condition and acts intentionally.174 This definition solves the 
problem of Blevins discussed in Part II. Minnesota’s statutory scheme only 
directly accounts for involuntary intoxication of a victim without the 
knowledge of that person,175 and thus misses a large swath of cases where the 
victim became intoxicated voluntarily.176 Prosecutors attempted to solve that 
problem using the physically helpless statute until the Blevins decision 
eliminated that possibility.177 However, Wisconsin’s straightforward 
prohibition in the heightened second-degree sexual assault statute of 
intercourse or contact with anyone who is so intoxicated that they cannot 
consent solves that problem. Adopting just this subdivision would allow 
prosecutors to adequately charge the sexual assaults of victims who are too 
intoxicated to consent without jumping through the many hoops and pitfalls 
of the Minnesota statutes.  
Wisconsin’s actual definition of consent does not differ greatly from 
the Minnesota definition. Just as in Minnesota, consent under Wisconsin’s 
definition “requires an affirmative indication of willingness. A failure to say 
no or to resist does not constitute consent in fact.”178 What makes 
Wisconsin’s statutory scheme so effective is its simplistic use of that 
definition in criminalizing nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse 
without the addition of other factors. Force especially is a remnant of 
outdated resistance requirements from common law notions of rape.179 
Force and injury definitions have become so convoluted through attempts 
to bring the CSC statutes in line with the real world that they are almost 
meaningless. The way forward is to completely abandon the five degrees of 
the current statutory scheme and instead adopt a system based on 
Wisconsin’s sexual assault laws.  
IV.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT AND THEIR 
COUNTERARGUMENTS 
While Minnesota’s consent definition by itself accurately reflects 
the definition of affirmative consent, arguments may still be made that the 
                                                           
174 Id. § 940.225(2)(cm).  
175 MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 7 (2019) (“‘Mentally incapacitated’ means that a person 
under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic, anesthetic, or any other substance, administered 
to that person without the person’s agreement, lacks the judgment to give a reasoned consent 
to sexual contact or sexual penetration.”). 
176 See, e.g., Stahl et al., When Rape Is Reported, supra note 9; Stahl et al., How Alcohol 
Foils Rape Investigations, supra note 17; No charges in University of Minnesota wrestling 
sexual assault investigation, supra note 26; Hennepin Attorney, supra note 30. 
177 State v. Blevins, 757 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008); see, e.g., State v. Griffith, 480 
N.W.2d 347, 349–50 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
178 State v. Long, 2009 WI 36, ¶ 31, 317 Wis. 2d 92, 107, 765 N.W.2d 557, 565.  
179 See Edwards, supra note 48, at 245. (“[U]nder the common law, the prosecution had to 
prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: carnal knowledge, force, and lack of 
consent.”). 
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current statutory scheme’s ultimate denial of affirmative consent in practice 
is a desirable result. These arguments are addressed in turn, and their 
counterarguments are given in the hopes of guiding debate.  
A.  Affirmative Consent Shifts the Burden of Proof 
The initial argument against the use of affirmative consent in rape 
statutes is that affirmative consent shifts the burden of proof from the State 
to the defendant. However, this is not the case in Wisconsin and will not be 
the case in Minnesota if the Legislature adopts substantially similar language.  
In State v. Grunke, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that 
Wisconsin’s sexual assault statutes' plain language established that lack of 
consent was an element of the offense that needed to be affirmatively proven 
by the State.180 “In order to achieve a conviction for third-degree sexual 
assault under Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3), the State must still prove the element 
‘without consent’ beyond a reasonable doubt.”181 The prosecution does not 
need to prove that the victim actively withheld consent; instead, it must 
prove that no affirmative consent was made.182 This burden is entirely on the 
State, and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.183  
While proving a negative can be difficult, it is not impossible and 
does not shift the burden onto a defendant to prove affirmative consent was 
given. Of course, the defendant is free to prove consent was given, which 
would bring into doubt the State’s case, but the defendant is not required to 
prove anything. Simply put, Wisconsin’s requirement that “without 
consent” be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as an element of its sexual 
assault statutes does not shift the burden onto defendants.  
B.  Affirmative Consent Ruins Sexual Intimacy   
Other commentators have complained that affirmative consent 
ruins traditional notions of sexual intimacy.184 To some extent, this may be 
                                                           
180 State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶ 28, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 769.  
181 Id. at ¶ 25.  
182 See id. at ¶ 28 (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2020)) (“The element ‘without 
consent’ in subsection (3) requires no affirmative act, such as the withholding of consent, on 
the part of the victim. Rather, the State must prove that there was no affirmative consent. 
Stated otherwise, the plain language of subsection (3) requires the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendants attempted to have sexual intercourse with the victim 
without her ‘words or overt actions . . . indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual 
intercourse.’ Wis. Stat. § 940.225(4). The State does not have to prove that the victim 
withheld consent.”) (alteration in original). 
183 Id.  
184 See Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search 
for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 981, 1009 (2008) (“But the greatest weakness 
of the policy was perhaps in its requirement that there be consent each and every time there 
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true. Affirmative consent runs counter to traditional, common law notions 
surrounding consent and sexual activity.185 Affirmative consent could not 
function during the late 1800s when by law, wives could not be raped by 
their husbands, and victims were required to resist “to the utmost” in order 
to convey their lack of consent.186 However, much has changed since then. 
The right to vote has been universally extended to everyone of age, and 
substantial steps have been taken to ensure equal treatment under the law.187 
Indeed, as noted above, even certain James Bond scenes that were socially 
acceptable in the mid-sixties are reprehensible now. It makes sense that legal 
norms surrounding consent and sexual activity should also adjust to reflect 
equal treatment under the law.  
Moreover, affirmative consent makes room for seduction and 
allows for consenting persons to change their minds. “Seduction is not 
rape,”188 and that is still true under the affirmative consent standard. An 
initial lack of affirmative consent, even an initial “no,” is evidence that could 
easily be overcome by other evidence of affirmative consent closer to the 
act in question.189 Even if a person initially plays “hard to get,” there should 
certainly be evidence that they gave affirmative consent before the act.190 A 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt, unanimously determined by twelve 
uninvolved peers, is a high burden. If a defendant was successful in their 
seduction and acquired affirmative consent, the odds of acquittal are very 
high if the case is even charged and survives motions for dismissal in the 
first place. Affirmative consent makes room for seduction and destroys 
traditional sexual norms that are worth leaving behind.191  
                                                           
is sexual activity. If the couple were living together and had relations every night upon 
undressing and going onto the bed, under the policy there must still be the series of verbal 
consents before any new level (whatever precisely that may be) is reached.” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
185 Nicholas J. Little, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational Results of 
an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321, 1359 (2005). 
186 See MINN. STAT. § 6191 (1891); State v. Ingraham, 118 Minn. 13, 17, 136 N.W. 258, 260 
(1912). 
187 See generally e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.  
188 Klein, supra note 184, at 1012.  
189 Little, supra note 185, at 1348. 
190 See Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No 
When They Mean Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women’s Token Resistance to 
Sex, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 872, 874 (1988) (discussing statistics about women 
initially saying no to sexual intercourse although they intended to say yes). 
191 See Little, supra note 185, at 1359. 
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C.  Affirmative Consent Will Cause False Rape Claims  
Some may argue that adopting an affirmative consent standard may 
lead to a surge of false rape claims.192 This argument begins with the incorrect 
premise that false reporting is rampant in rape cases.193 While it is difficult 
to estimate how many rape complaints are “false,” given the general 
underreporting of sexual assaults and difficulty in determining whether a 
claim was knowingly false or if an investigation simply did not find enough 
evidence to submit charges, studies have found that the incident of false 
reports is between two and ten percent.194 This percentage is roughly on par 
with the number of false accusations with other felonies.195  
Additionally, even with the affirmative consent standard, sexual 
assault crimes would still be subject to the same procedural checks they are 
today. Police will still investigate allegations to determine if there is enough 
evidence to submit to prosecutors.196 Prosecutors will provide an 
independent review of that evidence and determine if there is probable 
cause to believe a crime occurred and determine if it can reasonably be 
proven to a jury.197 The judicial branch provides an additional check, 
reviewing cases—even after conviction—to determine if sufficient evidence 
existed to support the conviction. If anything, the adoption of affirmative 
consent will focus investigation of rape allegations on what is important: what 
evidence exists suggesting a lack of affirmative consent? Finally, prosecutors 
                                                           
192 See id. at 1357. 
193 Cameron Kimble, Sexual Assault Remains Dramatically Underreported, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST. (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/sexual-
assault-remains-dramatically-underreported [https://perma.cc/6DCH-NMYR] (“[N]early 80 
percent of rapes and sexual assaults go unreported, according to a Justice Department 
analysis of violent crime in 2016”) (emphasis added). 
194 Melanie Heenan & Suellen Murray, Study of Reported Rapes in Victoria 2000-2003: 
Summary Research Report, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV. (2006) (finding 2.1 
percent of 812 reports of sexual assault to be false); David Lisak, Lori Gardinier, Sarah C. 
Nicksa & Ashley M. Cote, False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years of 
Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1329 (2010) (describing how 5.9 
percent of the 136 Boston cases of sexual assault found to be false); Kimberly A. Lonsway, 
Joanne Archambault & David Lisak, False Reports: Moving Beyond the Issue to Successfully 
Investigate and Prosecute Non-Stranger Sexual Assault, 43 PROSECUTOR, J. OF THE NAT’L 
DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N (2009) (describing how 140 (7 percent) of the 2,059 sexual assault 
reports across eight U.S. communities were found to be false). 
195 Little, supra note 185, at 1357 (“[F]alse accusations of rape are no more prevalent than 
false accusations of other types of major crime.”).  
196 Lonsway et al., supra note 194, at 15 (“[I]nvestigators and prosecutors must base all final 
judgments of a sexual assault report on the findings from a thorough, evidence-based 
investigation.”). 
197 See Little, supra note 185, at 1357–58 (“Prosecutors act as an effective screening 
mechanism here as well—given the difficulty of convicting a rapist, they tend only to prosecute 
the clearest cut cases, where the chances of conviction are greatest.”). 
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and defense attorneys will still require that victims testify under oath.198 The 
Confrontation Clause will allow the defendant to cross-examine the victim 
to determine if the report was indeed false.199 While some false reporting 
may still occur, the adoption of an affirmative consent standard is unlikely 
to increase the number of these occurrences.  
D.  Affirmative Consent Does Not Solve the Voluntarily Intoxication 
Problem 
The final argument against affirmative consent is that it does not 
solve the problem of determining consent through the ambiguity of sexual 
signaling—especially when both parties are voluntarily intoxicated.200 On the 
one hand, adoption of a standard similar to Wisconsin’s prohibition of 
sexual activity with “a person who is under the influence of an intoxicant to 
a degree which renders that person incapable of giving consent”201 would at 
least make for a more exact standard than Minnesota’s current statutes. 
However, determining when a person is so intoxicated that they are 
incapable of consent remains difficult. Sexual signaling is ambiguous—an act 
or word may mean one thing to one person and something entirely different 
to another. Even a “no” spoken sarcastically to a person with a strong 
understanding of the speaker may be accurately interpreted to mean “yes.”202  
Affirmative consent does not solve this problem, but it does mark 
a step in the right direction.203 Minnesota’s current statutory scheme of 
watered-down definitions of force and injury and overlapping enhancement 
elements only compounds that problem for juries—not only must they 
determine what the actors meant, they also have to figure out what the 
statutes mean, which is less than ideal. Adopting a simpler standard, such as 
that from Wisconsin, will allow juries to focus on the conduct at trial and 
not the difficult to understand statutory language. Certainly, no statutory 
language is perfect, but adopting language similar to Wisconsin’s is a step in 
the right direction.  
                                                           
198 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 65 (2004) (prohibiting out of court testimony 
from witness available at trial). 
199 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
200 Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, The Conundrum of Voluntary Intoxication and Sex, 82 
BROOK. L. REV. 1031, 1048–49 (2017).  
201 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(2)(cm) (West 2020).  
202 Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 190, at 874. 
203 Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 200, at 1048 (“[T]he affirmative consent standard 
transforms the legal meaning of passivity.”). 
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V.  PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
Given the above discussion, Minnesota should take several steps to 
bring its CSC statutes in line with affirmative consent. Minnesota can do this 
by taking model language from Wisconsin and adopting that language into 
four degrees of sexual assault.  
The most important step the Legislature should take is removing 
the force or injury requirements from third-degree and fourth-degree 
CSC.204 This removal would criminalize sexual penetration and sexual 
contact when a defendant fails to obtain affirmative consent, regardless of 
the surrounding circumstances. Nonconsensual sexual contact or 
penetration is the action that should be criminalized, without regard to force 
or injury. 
Aggravating factors of threats or injuries should be used to enhance 
either sexual contact or sexual penetration to second-degree sexual assault.205 
Both sexual contact and sexual penetration are treated similarly in this 
instance because the true level of criminality comes from the threat of injury 
in combination with the assault without affirmative consent. Additional 
aggravating factors of great bodily harm or use of a dangerous weapon 
should likewise elevate the crime to first-degree sexual assault.206 Again, the 
level of criminality comes from the degree of injury or use of a weapon in 
combination with the assault.  
Additionally, Minnesota can preserve its graduated punishments by 
adopting Wisconsin’s third-and fourth-degree assault statutes.207 Fourth-
degree sexual assault, like fifth-degree CSC, punishes nonconsensual sexual 
contact as a gross misdemeanor unless aggravating factors are present.208 
This sole use of a gross misdemeanor sentence reflects the reality that sexual 
contact without affirmative consent—while reprehensible—does not rise to 
the same level as sexual intercourse without affirmative consent. This 
standard was adopted by the Minnesota Legislature when it ratified fifth-
degree CSC and should remain in place with the new amendments.209  
Finally, Minnesota’s current statutory scheme includes special 
relationship statutes, which identify specific trustee relationships that 
                                                           
204 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2020). 
205 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.342, subdiv. 1(e) (2019) (aggravating rape to first degree where 
a personal injury was inflicted through the use of force).  
206 See, e.g., id. § 609.342, subdiv. 1(d) (2019) (aggravating rape to first degree where the 
perpetrator was armed). 
207 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(3)–(3m) (West 2020). 
208 Id. § 940.225(3m). 
209 See MINN. STAT. § 609.3451, subdiv. 1 (2019). 
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preclude a victim from furnishing voluntary or meaningful consent.210 These 
relationship statutes have been the focus of most of the post-1975 
amendments to Minnesota’s CSC statutes and have been retained in the 
proposed second-degree assault provisions.211 These well-defined and highly 
specific special relationships have been of great concern to the Legislature 
in recent history and should be retained.  
Making these changes to Minnesota’s CSC statutes will allow 
prosecutors to punish nonconsensual sexual contact and sexual intercourse 
as the crimes they are. These statutes do not rely on watered-down judicial 
definitions of force and injury, nor do they create insurmountable hurdles 
in the prosecution of voluntarily intoxicated victim cases. The amendments 
strike an appropriate balance between proscribing criminality and clearly 
delineating what that criminality consists of. Minnesota should move quickly 
to make these changes and adopt a fully affirmative consent standard for its 
sexual assault statutes.  
VI.  MODEL LANGUAGE 
1)  First degree sexual assault. Whoever does any of the following is guilty 
of a felony, punishable by no more than 30 years.  
(a) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person 
without consent of that person and causes pregnancy or great bodily harm 
to that person. 
(b) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person 
without consent of that person by use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon 
or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably 
to believe it to be a dangerous weapon. 
(c) Is aided or abetted by one or more other persons and has sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of that 
person by use or threat of force or violence. 
 
(2) Second degree sexual assault. Whoever does any of the following is 
guilty of a felony punishable by 25 years, except that violation of subdivision 
(g), (h), and (i) are punishable by 15 years: 
(a) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person 
without consent of that person by use or threat of force or violence. 
                                                           
210 See, e.g., id. § 609.345, subdivs. 1(i), (l)–(m), (o)–(p) (2019) (prohibiting psychotherapists, 
clergy members, correctional officers, massage therapists, and police officers from engaging 
in sexual relations with their wards with whom they deal professionally). 
211 See, e.g., Act of Aug. 10, 2010, ch. 270, § 3, 2010 Minn. Laws 1, 4 (clarifying penal 
custodial relationships); Act of May 7, 2007, ch. 54, § 4, 2007 Minn. Laws 1, 31 (prohibiting 
sex with massage therapists); Act of May 17, 2002, ch. 381, § 4, 2007 Minn. Laws 1311, 1313 
(prohibiting sex with special transportation providers). 
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(b) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person 
without consent of that person and causes injury, illness, disease or 
impairment of a sexual or reproductive organ, or mental anguish 
requiring psychiatric care for the victim. 
(c) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person  
(i) who suffers from a mental illness or deficiency which 
renders that person temporarily or permanently incapable 
of appraising the person's conduct, and the defendant 
knows of such condition, or;  
(ii) who is under the influence of an intoxicant to a degree 
which renders that person incapable of giving consent if the 
defendant has actual knowledge that the person is 
incapable of giving consent and the defendant has the 
purpose to have sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
the person while the person is incapable of giving consent. 
(d) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who the 
defendant knows is unconscious. 
(f) Is aided or abetted by one or more other persons and has sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse with another person without the 
consent of that person. 
(g) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person and  
(1) has a significant relationship with that person, or  
(2) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a 
patient of the psychotherapist and the sexual penetration 
occurred: 
(i) during the psychotherapy session; or 
(ii) outside the psychotherapy session if an ongoing 
psychotherapist-patient relationship exists. 
Consent by the complainant is not a defense; 
(3) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a 
former patient of the psychotherapist and the former 
patient is emotionally dependent upon the 
psychotherapist; 
(4) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a 
patient or former patient and the sexual penetration 
occurred by means of therapeutic deception. Consent by 
the complainant is not a defense; 
(5) the actor accomplishes the sexual penetration by means 
of deception or false representation that the penetration is 
for a bona fide medical purpose. Consent by the 
complainant is not a defense; 
(6) the actor is or purports to be a member of the clergy, 
the complainant is not married to the actor, and: 
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(i) the sexual penetration occurred during the 
course of a meeting in which the complainant 
sought or received religious or spiritual advice, aid, 
or comfort from the actor in private; or 
(ii) the sexual penetration occurred during a 
period of time in which the complainant was 
meeting on an ongoing basis with the actor to seek 
or receive religious or spiritual advice, aid, or 
comfort in private. Consent by the complainant is 
not a defense; 
(7) the actor is an employee, independent contractor, or 
volunteer of a state, county, city, or privately operated adult 
or juvenile correctional system, or secure treatment facility, 
or treatment facility providing services to clients civilly 
committed as mentally ill and dangerous, sexually 
dangerous persons, or sexual psychopathic personalities, 
including, but not limited to, jails, prisons, detention 
centers, or work release facilities, and the complainant is a 
resident of a facility or under supervision of the 
correctional system. Consent by the complainant is not a 
defense; 
(8) the actor provides or is an agent of an entity that 
provides special transportation service, the complainant 
used the special transportation service, and the sexual 
penetration occurred during or immediately before or after 
the actor transported the complainant. Consent by the 
complainant is not a defense; 
(9) the actor performs massage or other bodywork for hire, 
the complainant was a user of one of those services, and 
nonconsensual sexual penetration occurred during or 
immediately before or after the actor performed or was 
hired to perform one of those services for the complainant; 
or 
(10) the actor is a peace officer, as defined in section 
626.84, and the officer physically or constructively restrains 
the complainant, or the complainant does not reasonably 
feel free to leave the officer's presence. Consent by the 
complainant is not a defense. This paragraph does not 
apply to any penetration of the mouth, genitals, or anus 
during a lawful search. 
(h) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with an individual who 
is confined in a correctional institution if the actor is a correctional 
staff member. This paragraph does not apply if the individual with 
whom the actor has sexual contact or sexual intercourse is subject 
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to prosecution for the sexual contact or sexual intercourse under 
this section. 
(i) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with an individual who 
is on probation, parole, or extended supervision if the actor is a 
probation, parole, or extended supervision agent who supervises 
the individual, either directly or through a subordinate, in his or her 
capacity as a probation, parole, or extended supervision agent or 
who has influenced or has attempted to influence another 
probation, parole, or extended supervision agent's supervision of 
the individual. This paragraph does not apply if the individual with 
whom the actor has sexual contact or sexual intercourse is subject 
to prosecution for the sexual contact or sexual intercourse under 
this section. 
  
(3) Third degree sexual assault. 
(a) Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person without the 
consent of that person is guilty of a felony punishable by no more 
than 10 years. 
(b) Whoever has sexual contact with a person in either of the 
following manners is guilty of a felony punishable by 15 years:  
(i) Intentional penile ejaculation of ejaculate or intentional 
emission of urine or feces by the defendant or, upon the 
defendant's instruction, by another person upon any part 
of the body clothed or unclothed of the complainant if that 
ejaculation or emission is either for the purpose of sexually 
degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or for 
the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant 
(ii) For the purpose of sexually degrading or humiliating 
the complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying the 
defendant, intentionally causing the complainant to 
ejaculate or emit urine or feces on any part of the 
defendant's body, whether clothed or unclothed. 
 
(4) Fourth degree sexual assault. Except as provided in sub. (3)(b), whoever 
has sexual contact with a person without the consent of that person is guilty 
of a gross misdemeanor. 
 
(4) Consent. “Consent", as used in this section, means words or overt 
actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a 
freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact. Consent 
does not mean the existence of a prior or current social relationship between 
the actor and the complainant or that the complainant failed to resist a 
particular sexual act. Consent is not an issue in alleged violations of sub. (2) 
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(c), (d), (g), (h), and (i). The following persons are presumed incapable of 
consent but the presumption may be rebutted by competent evidence, 
(a) A person suffering from a mental illness or defect which impairs 
capacity to appraise personal conduct. 
(b) A person who is unconscious or for any other reason is 
physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act. 
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